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Meaning of Metaphorical Speech'"
Gerald P. Gleeson
1. Introduction
I wish to explore the relationship between linguistic meaning and that
non-linguistic meaning which is experienced in cultural, aesthetic, and
religious contexts: the relationship between the meaning of sentences,
on the one hand, and the meaning of gestures, facial expressions,
poems, worlcs of art, rituals, and symbols, on the other hand. These
latter cases I will characterise in terms of relevant or significant
meaning. (The term 'significant' meaning is stipulative, the pheno-
menon, I hope to show, is not.)
It is one thing to speak of linguistic and non-linguistic meaning,
it is another to adequately explain the distinction and relationship
between them. Ordinary usage clearly indicates their kinship, for we
as easily speak of understanding and meaning with respect to worlcs
of art, as we do with respect to the sentences of a language. In
commenting on the achievement of analytic philosophy, Roger
Scruton has noted that while it has done much to elucidate linguistic
meaning, it has not been as successful with what he terms
'intentional' or cultural meaning-where meaning is not semantic, but
is embodied and 'immanent in experience'. \
Like Scruton, I wish to resist the extension of the linguistic model
of meaning into non-linguistic contexts, an extension which might be
suggested by talk about the 'language' of clothes or colours or
paintings, and of 'decoding' cultural symbols, and so on. While such
talk may be suggestive, it is of limited explanatory value. By contrast,
a narrow, even austere, account of linguistic meaning, creates the
needed space in which the distinctive character of the personal,
aesthetic and cultural meanings which help to constitute specifically
human existence comes into view.
I will illustrate this claim by examining the phenomenon of
metaphorical speech. The imponance and interest of metaphorical
speech, I will argue, lies in the fact that it involves meaning in both
• Paper given to the Inaugural Colloquium of the Sydney Society of Literature
and Aesthetics, Oct. 4-5, 1990.
R. Scruton, 'Analytic Philosophy and the Meaning of Music', Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 45 (1987): 169.
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senses-metaphor is a linguistic act whose use and reception invites
comparison with aesthetic appreciation and experiences of cultural and
personal meaning: what something or someone 'means to me' (or 'to
us'). Metaphors, having no special linguistic meaning of their own,
invoke the meaning or significance speakers have for each other.
Accordingly, the 'embodied' or significant meaning of metaphorical
speech is a distinctive kind of 'personal speech', a touchstone of
significance between speakers, and also highlights the 'personal'
dimension of all speech.
I begin by broadly characterizing the distinction between linguistic
and non-linguistic meaning.
2. Two concepts of meaning.
Perhaps the two most general features of any meaningful
phenomenon (whether linguistic or non-linguistic) are first, that it
exemplifies some pattern or structure whose repetition can be
perceptually recognized, and secondly, that it directs us to
'something' beyond itself. Some-thing has meaning (is a 'signifier')
if it 'stands out' from its back-ground which is constituted by a field
or context of 'differences', and seems to direct us to something
beyond that field of differentiation (to a 'signified').2 The sentences
of a language clearly exhibit these features, as do ritual gestures,
facial expressions and some works of an. The non-linguistic
examples are important because they remind us that something may be
evocative or expressive, directing us beyond itself, without there
being an 'entity', object, or 'content' to which we are referred. A
facial expression may be 'intransitive': exhibiting' a particular
expression', without there being anything of which it is the
expression.3
H. P. Grice introduced the now famous distinction between
'natural' and 'non-natural' or conventional meaning.4 The fonner is
exemplified when smoke means fire, or spots mean measles, and in
simple animal signalling devices. Word and sentence meaning is
2 The echoes of structural linguistics are deliberate. However, the scare quotes
around 'signifier' and 'signified' are to emphasize my pre-theoretical use of
these terms. Just how they are to be understood is precisely the issue in the
philosophy of language.
3 Scruton, p.173. Cf. Ludwig Wittgcnstcin, The Blue and The Brown Books.
Oxford, 1972, pp.158f.
4 Cf. H. P. Grice, 'Meaning', The Philosophical Review, 66 (1957): 377-88;
'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions'. The Philosophical Review, 78 (1969):
147-177.
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obviously not 'natural' in this way; it is conventional. Linguistic
meaning is distinguished by the fact that the 'non-natural'
(conventional) relationship between 'signifier' and 'signified' can be
expressed in disquotational claims of the form'S' means that p, so
that, for example, in understanding a sentence'S' one understands
(grasps the proposition) that p.
The examples of non-linguistic meaning I have mentioned-
smiles, rituals, art works--are not entirely 'natural' in Grice's sense,
for although they are perhaps founded in 'natural' reactions to
sensible impressions, aspects and perceptions, their recognition
typically presupposes culturally endorsed patterns of interpretation.
Sometimes these non-linguistic meanings amount to nothing more
than a conventional, code usage (e.g. stereotypical gestures, a smile
or wink as a signal, etc.) which could be given a reductive,
disquotational expression. Moreoften, these ('expressive') meanings
defy a reductive linguistic formulation because, in our experience of
them, 'signifier' and 'signified' (an expression or representation and
what is expressed or represented) cannot be separated.S Disquotation
is impossible because the understanding of meaning here is, as
Scruton puts it, 'immanent in an experience' of the signifier (e.g. in
participating in a ritual, seeing a smile, viewing a work of an).
Understanding a piece of music is immanent in one's hearing the
music. Although the sadness one hears in a piece of music might be
related to the use of a minor chord. a disquotational claim such as 'a
minor chord means sadness' (like 'a smile means welcome').
however commonly true. is clearly problematic. In this paper when I
speak of 'non-linguistic meaning' I will be referring to experiences of
meaning which are both non-natural and not reducible to linguistic
formulation (a phenomenon to which Grice did not advert).
A paradigmatic instance of non-linguistic meaning in this sense is
that of 'what someone or something means to me'.6 Meaning in this
instance takes the form of 'significance' or 'relevance': certain people,
works of art, rituals, gestures. and metaphors, may be 'striking',
'touching', or 'impressive' for cenain people and not for others. The
'relevance' one experiences will be reflected in behaviour and speech,
5 Cf. Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language. Cambridge, 1985, pp.219-
220.
6 Arnold Bunns first drew my allention to this characterization of 'relevant'
meaning and to the comparison with linguistic meaning that will be
developed. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zellel, Second Edition, G. E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.), G. E. M. Anscombc (trans.) Oxford,
1981. p.155: 'A poet's words can pierce us .... (and cr. p.170).
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and in the selection of, and attachment to, some facts rather than
others. 'Relevant meaning' is found in personal relationships, and in
aesthetic, cultural and 'intentional' experiences more widely.
The distinguishing feature of meaning as relevance is not
disquotation, but rather the way in which an already meaningful
phenomena comes to possess new relevance or panicular significance
for someone, e.g. the transition from knowing someone as an
acquaintance to falling in love with them, from understanding the
rules of a game to grasping its point, and perhaps wanting to play it,
from hearing sounds to hearing a variation on a musical theme, and
from understanding what an utterance (literally) says, to appreciating
its metaphorical point. Wittgenstein in panicular noted the links
between linguistic and 'relevant' meaning when he likened the
transition from sounds to semantic meaning (hearing sounds as
language) to discerning the humanity in a man. He also compares
understanding language, especially poetry, with understanding music
(PG, 41; PI, 527).7
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a
theme in music than one may think ... [cf. PG,41)
How curious: we should like to explain the understanding of a
gesture as a translation into words. and the understanding of
words as a translation into gestures ... [PG,42j
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can
be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense
in which it cannot be replaced by any other ...
In the one case the thought in the sentence is something
common to different sentences; in the other. something that
is expressed only by these words in these positions.
(Understanding a poem.) ...
... I want to apply the word 'understanding' to all this [PI.527.
531.532).
There are thus both similarities and differences between the
meanings of sentences, and the non-linguistic meaning of gestures,
rituals, and an works. The laner presuppose language, but cannot be
reduced to disquotational statement; it always involves something
'given' at a prior level of meaning (e.g. as physical sound), and a
'progression' (e.g. to music) which is neither necessitated nor
explained by that prior level.
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Grammar (PG). Rush Rhees (cd.).
Anthony Kenny (trans.). Oxford. 1974; Philosophical Investigations (PI).
G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford. 1974.
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3. Metaphor as linguistic and significant.
Metaphor, simile, irony, and the figurative use of language, are so all
pervasive that it would be perverse to regard them as linguistically
unusual or deviant, or requiring special justification. Sober, factual,
informative language is, if anything, the exception not the rule of
human communication. Nevertheless, metaphorical and figurative
speech is typically thought to involve some incongruity, tension or
disturbance with respect to our standard expectations as to words
mean. Likewise philosophical theories of metaphor typically present it
as somehow 'abnormal', as an aberration or complicated extension
from an ideal of literal speech which purports to constitute the essence
of language. We can identify four different accounts of linguistic
meaning, each with its corresponding account of metaphor.
1) Linguistic meaning is explicated in terms of speakers' mean-
ings, of what they intend to achieve by their utterances; the meaning
of metaphor or a poem is thence explained as a distinctive kind of
speech-act. A speaker says one thing. but ('really') means something
else. Thus T. S. Eliot said that poets 'tum blood into ink', he meant
that poetic composition is a arduous, heartfelt endeavour, etc...
2) Linguistic meaning is explicated in terms of semantic meanings
generated by the words one uses. Words have associations,
implications, and semantic fields which speakers may combine in
unusual ways, thus generating perhaps new metaphorical meanings.
Metaphorical utterances, in themselves, say something special. By
combining 'ink' with the transformation of 'blood', Eliot fused their
diverse associations and semantic fields to produce a unique new
semantic entity.
These two proposals are each a refinement of commonsense ideas
about the dependence of language both on speaker's intentions and on
the powers of the words one uses. They each provide some insight
into the working of metaphorical speech, and each has received
sophisticated and impressive development. However, it can be argued
that these approaches fail to grasp just how deeply problematic human
communication really is. For:
3) Thirdly, one might interrogate the very idea of an utterance
having a meaning, of referring or taking us to something beyond
itself. In directing us beyond itself, a saying, like every sign, aims to
make present something that is, necessarily, absent. It would not
remain a sign if what it signified was indeed present. Consequently,
according to the 'de-constructionist' strategy associated with Jacques
Derrida, there must always be a conflict, a gap, between what is said
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and what it is supposed to mean. The linguistic tension evident in
metaphorical speech pervades communication; that is to say, all
speech is to some extent metaphorical. 'We arc always saying, never
quite what we mean. And always we mean, never quite what we
say'.8
This rather abstract statement of a deconstructionist view may be
illustrated by considering the way linguistic (and other) signifiers may
become 'contaminated' in their subsequent use and in altered
contexts, for example when the title of a novel (or a musical theme)
is used in a television commercial, or when lines of the Hebrew
Scriptures are read in the context of current Middle Eastern conflicts.
By emphasizing the exposure of language to subsequent
contamination, deconstructionist thought suggests that we can never
be sure that what we say will realize what we mean. Language
necessarily involves 'iterable' or repeatable sayings, and the
possibility of contamination through repetition is ineliminable. Since
'metaphor' is the traditional name for that figure of speech in which
words are 'transferred' from a literal to a non-literal application,
deconstructionist writers conclude that metaphoricity and
'transference' is a possibility condition of all communication. .
This line of thought is believed to have profound consequences
for philosophy itself. If all language is metaphorical, then a
philosophical inquiry which purports to say clearly what metaphor is
will itself be undermined by the 'figurality' of its language.
Accordingly, deconstructionist writers delight in revealing the
inconsistencies between an author's intentions and his language-for
example, Locke's inability to explain 'simple terms'-the paradigm of
the literal-in a non-figurative way.9
While the deconstructionist motif is most persuasive in the case of
'sayings' which, like literary titles and religious expressions, are
'embedded' in special contexts of significance, its applicability to
language as a whole is more problematic. Paradigmatically literal
sayings, like many mathematical and scientific utterances, seem
relatively context-free and immune to contamination. Whatever our
uncertainties as to what Eliot meant, or what he was up to, we simply
don't have the same doubts about the straightforward meaning of the
words he used: he said that poets tum blood into ink.
8 Marjorie Grene, 'Life, Death, And Language: Some thoughts on Willgenstein
and Derrida', Partisan Review, 43 (1976): 265-279, 272.
9 See e.g. Paul de Man, 'The Epistemology of Metaphor', Critical Inquiry, 5:1
(Autumn 1978): t3-30. '
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The relative stability of these meanings suggests that the
'deconstructionist turn' does not offer a complete account of linguistic
meaning. Contemporary philosophy in fact offers an alternative and, I
would argue, complementary account of linguistic meaning and its
relative stability. This alternative also suggests that philosophy's use
of metaphor need not necessarily undermine its 'rigour'.
4) Thus, with Wittgenstein, we may seek to dissolve or at least
neutralize the problematic opposition between what is said and what is
meant. Eliot spoke of the poet's pains at turning blood into ink: his
utterance means just what it says, It does not generate a special
metaphorical semantic meaning; nor is there some determinate
propositional content that Eliot wanted to convey. His saying leads us
to entertain various thoughts, images and analogies as we respond to
it: it will find its place in our critical engagement with Eliot's writings
and in our reflection on the task of the poet. It thereby acquires
meaning or significance for us-not because of a supposed
'metaphorical speaker- or word-meaning', but rather because of the
ways in which we receive it and develop it. The significance of
metaphorical sayings resides in their engagement with our thoughts,
imaginations and activities, and in the way in which speakers are
united through the shared significance sayings have for them. Pace
the deconstructionist view, we need not regard metaphorical sayings
as unavoidably failing to make their meaning present.
This fourth position accords with the 'no meaning' account of
metaphor first proposecfby Donald Davidson. tO I have associated it
also with Wittgenstein who, despite the absence from his writings of
any explicit discussion of metaphor, examines a number of related
phenomena and shows how 'meaning' must 'drop out' if they are to
be appreciated rightly. To understand language, music, bodily
expression, and human 'forms ofHfe' in general, we must give up the
eductive illusion of a meaning which accompanies them, or is hidden
behind them, to which they point, and which really 'gives life' to
otherwise 'dead signs', Freed from the illusion of meaning as an
'object', even an absent object, we can appreciate human existence,
culture and language for what they are, criticizing them as
appropriate, but without invoking the foundational justifications that
philosophers have typically sought.
The 'no meaning' account of the linguistic realization of metaphor
leaves room for consideration of their non-linguistic significance:
10 Donald Davidson, 'What Metaphors Mean', in Inquiries into Truth and
InJerpretation, Oxford, 1984.
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successfll metaphor depends-not on special semantic or speaker-
meanings, but-on the meaning, value and significance speakers have
for each other. Metaphors-like jokes, slang and works of art-
separate those for whom they arc striking from those for whom they
are not. By denying that metaphors have a distinctive linguistic
meaning, the 'no meaning' account highlights the dependence of
metaphor on our experience of non-linguistic, relevant meaning.
I will briefly outline this 'no meaning' account of metaphor, in
order to show how metaphorical speech involves the two forms of
meaning I have distinguished. Like any utterance, a metaphor has a
linguistic or semantic realization; some account must be given of what
these words mean. However, if Davidson is right, nothing more
needs to be said about the semantics of metaphorical utterances than
about the semantics of any other kind of utterances. In no case is
'meaning' an explanatory phenomenon, a 'content' which stands
behind or alongside utterances. Davidson's model of 'radical
interpretation' reveals why and how we come to speak of utterances
'having a meaning', but also shows why the notion of meaning
should 'drop out' of our explanations of linguistic practice.
The model of radical interpretation supposes we are trying to
understand the speech of those whose language and beliefs are
unknown to us. Understanding what they say is one aspect of coming
to understand them. The evidence most critical to identifying what
they are saying concerns what they hold (and desire to be) true. A
theory of meaning for their language, Davidson urges, is best
modelled by a Tarski-style truth theory which simply 'pairs'
utterances with truth conditions, (' Snow is white' is true if snow is
white), and so tells us what individual sentences say or mean.
Metaphor then becomes, in David Cooper's words, the 'maverick'
use of a saying since it is not the committed assertion of what it says
according to the theory of linguistic meaning which emerges from
within the project of interpretation. I I Thus used, metaphors have
many effects: prompting thoughts, images and comparisons, setting a
mood, triggering insight and emotion, and so on. Metaphorical
utterances say and mean what they do, and have their distinctive
powers just because they do. 12 Although Robert Fogelin describes
Davidson's essay as merely a 'gesture' towards a 'causal theory' of
11 Thus, while Eliot said or asserted that a poet turns blood into ink, we do not
take him to believe this.
12 David E. Cooper. Metaphor, Oxford, 1986, p.1 05. Page references will be
given in the body of the text. My debt to Cooper's study will be obvious.
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metaphor,13 Cooper's sustained critique of alternative theories and his
detailed elaooration of Davidson's insight, has shown how powerful
it is. In short, metaphor, metonymy, hyperoole, etc. are to be taken
out of the orbit occupied by the information-giving devices of
language and brought into, or close to, the one occupied by songs,
poems, myths, allegories, and the like (Cooper, 108).
The chief objection to Davidson's account of metaphor has been
that it makes the interpretations, that is, the' effects' , of metaphor as
arbitrary and contingent as those of a bump on the head (Davidson's
own image). It offers no principled way of distinguishing those
('prompted ') thoughts which are plausible interpretations of a
metaphor from the idle associations it happens to trigger. Richard
Rorty welcomes this conclusion, writing that Davidson 'lets us see
metaphors on the model of unfamiliar events in the natural world',
that is 'unfamiliar noises' which happen to have all sorts of interesting
effects. 14
But Rorty's tendentious reading of Davidson, as well as the
worry about the arbitrariness of a metaphor's effects, can be over-
come once we recognize the context of 'significant meaning' which
metaphors presuppose.
As David Cooper has argued, understanding the purpose of
metaphor is the key to understanding its nature (Cooper, 4), and its
'sustaining purpose' is, in Ted Cohen's phrase, 'the cultivation of
intimacy' between speakers.
Cooper notes that the social role of metaphor was first perceived
by Aristotle when he said it was out of place for slaves to address a
('striking') metaphor to their masters-for slaves ought not 'strike'
their masters (Rhetorica, 1404b; Cooper, 152-3). Thc purposc of
metaphor, its social function, is evident from the special interpretative
competencies, and so the 'intimacy', which it assumes betwecn
speakers (an intimacy to which slaves have no right). Cooper
identifies two ways in which frcsh metaphors presuppose and
reinforce intimacy.
First, metaphors are 'cxtraordinary' utterances in so far as
ordinary interpretative competencc is insufficient for receiving thcm.
'Ordinary competence' includes the ability to disambiguate the right
semantic reading of an utterancc, to recognize its force, to assign
referents to indexical terms, and so on. With an extraordinary
utterance additional competence is required-just as it is for some
13 Robert 1. Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking, Yale, 1988, p.?!.
14 Richard Rorly. 'Unfamiliar Noises', PASS. 61 (1987): 283-296. 289.
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slang expressions. An extraordinary unerance will be 'justified' when
addressed to a hearer on the reasonable assumption that he will be
able to interpret it (cf. the use of esoteric slang in appropriate circum-
stances)(Cooper, 155). Cooper associates 'ordinary' interpretative
competence with 'general intimacy':
the bond, however weak, between those who share not only a
basic linguistic competence in the same language, but a common
stock of information, and the abilities and intel1igence to cal1
upon that information when interpreting one another (Cooper,
156).
'Special intimacy' is presupposed by an extraordinary and
justified utterance. This bond unites a particular group within the
larger speech community. Whether small or large in number, the
group will remain fairly constant with respect to a wide range
of utterances: and in practice the intimacy will concern not
only utterances, but much else-work, interests, environment,
sensibilities, linguistic experience etc., even specialist knowledge in
an area (Cooper, 157): so the special intimacy required for metaphor
reception 'does not dissolve when the metaphor is put aside', and
goes deeper that the shared ability to interpret metaphors (Cooper,
158). Metaphor 'may be viewed as a signal that the speaker takes his
hearers to belong to a subset distinguished by a bond of intimacy'
(Cooper, 158). Funhermore, hearers will assume that the speaker can
also interpret the unerance (it is not just a quote), and can assess their
attempts to interpret it: successful interpretation will reinforce the
speaker's and his audience's belief that they do indeed belong to a
special subgroup (Cooper, 158).
Secondly, the interpretation of metaphor may require the
'intimacy' of appreciating the attitude and motivations of the speaker
(Cooper, 161). It is crucial in these instances that the requisite
viewpoint or anitude not be identified explicitly. In this way metaphor
differs from the explicit invitation to think of A in tenns of B
(Cooper, 160). For example, a full appreciation of Banhcs' saying,
'To think is to sweat', presumes a knowledge of Marxist thought
about the relationships between labour and work, manual and
intellectual work, and so on (Cooper, 163). The additional intimacy
metaphor requires is often 'constituted by that attitude or viewpoint
which the speaker must take his audience to share (or appreciate) if
his use of the metaphor is to be 'justified' (Cooper, 163).
Beyond the ties of interests, background, sensibility and so on,
which a metaphor so often presupposes for its interpretation,
there is also the intimacy of attitude or viewpoint which is
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presupposed if the utterance of the metaphor, in place of
something more explicit, is to be 'justified'(Cooper, 163).
For this reason paraphrase of a metaphor is out of place precisely
because it would explicitly mention the requisite attitude. Explicitation
undermines intimacy because intimacy is allied with a sense of
belonging, with 'in-groups' as opposed to 'out-groups'. 'Compact',
implicit metaphor of this kind, like secret symbols and pass-words,
must be safeguarded from the knowledge of all and sundry.
Cooper acknowledges that his argument does not yet show that
intimacy sustains metaphor, but notes that intimacy, communion, and
the sense of being closer to some people than to others, matter
universally; moreover, there is no known language which does not
employ metaphor (Cooper, 164). Some empirical considerations
reinforce his thesis: first, the prevalence of metaphor among those for
whom intimacy matters most-e.g. soldiers at war and prisoners IS.
Secondly, the most prized metaphors are those whose interpretations
require significant degrees of intimacy, e.g. Foucault's 'Knowledge
is an instrument for cutting' is only fully appreciated by those with
knowledge of the history of different epistemological metaphors
(Cooper, 165). Thirdly, we do find, as we should expect on the
intimacy thesis, that very many metaphors allude to, emphasise or
encourage real or imagined ties between people; for example. there is
the use of personification in talk of the nation as a 'Fatherland, and
also the 'conduit' metaphors for communication between people (e.g.
words carry meaning, ideas come through to me, they move or strike
us, tugging at our heart-strings). In the latter case, Cooper suggests,
metaphor aims not so much to 'get a handle on' the intangible, as to
comfort by portraying the relationship between human minds in terms
of physical and concrete intimacy. 'It is metoric's way of doing battle
15 Robert Hughes records an extraordinary range of 'gallows argot' among
condemned prisoners in 18th century London, and its contrast with the
official language of 'paying the supreme penalty' and being 'launched into
Eternity'. Convicts 'died with cotton in their ears' ( Cotton being the
praying sexton): the hangman was 'the nubbing-cove', 'the switcher', 'the
sheriff's journeyman'; the gallows was 'the three legged-mare', 'the deadly
Nevergreen that bears fruit all year-round'; the noose was 'a horse's night
cap'; to ascend the gallows was 'to go up the ladder to bed', 'to be in deadly
suspense'; to be hung was 'to dance upon nothing', 'to take the earth bath',
'to ride a horse foaled by an acorn'. Hughes comments: 'This is not the
language of a penitent thief. Its brusque. canting defiance reminds one that
hanging meant one thing to the judges but another to the poor and the
mob'. The Falal Shore, London, 1987, p.33. What it meant to them is
embodied in the metaphors they used.
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against solipsism'.16 Cooper claims that the empirical support for his
thesis is not so crucial, because it has been shown that intimacy is
involved in the two ways mentioned, and people do pursue and value
intimacy. 'A practice which nourishes intimacy will at least tend to be
sustained simply because this is what it does'(Cooper, 167).
Invitations to interpretation in the shape of metaphors will tend
to be reciprocated. By inviting interpretation. the speaker
typically gives himself out to be someone upon whom a
reciprocated metaphor will not be wasted-one, that is, which
requires similar interests, background, etc. for its ·interpretation
to the first. And by evoking an altitude which his hearers are
assumed to share or be familiar with, the speaker also shows
himself to be someone to whom they can justifiably address
metaphors which evoke a similar attitude. Once reciprocity is
underway, the pressure is on for it to be sustained, for the refusal
by someone to engage in further metaphors of the relevant sort
will be perceived abdication from the circle of people with the
interests. tastes and attitudes in question(Cooper, 167).
4. Personal speech.
Cooper's 'intimacy thesis' may be re-expressed in terms of the
'significant meaning' of what I will characterise as distinctively
personal speech. As W. H. Auden remarked:
Any consideration of the nature of language must begin with dis-
tinguishing between our use of words as a code of communication
between individuals and our use of them for personal speech.17
'Personal speech', Auden wrote, is voluntary, between persons,
and arises from the desire to disclose ourselves to another; it involves
a search for words such that we do not know what we will say till we
say it. It will be marked grammatically by proper names. first and
second person pronouns, words of summons and command,
response and obedience. The meaning of personal speech is 'the
outcome of a dialogue between words... and the response of whoever
is listening to them ... '18 Personal speech exemplifies what Charles
Taylor terms 'expressive meaning', as opposed to 'designative'
meaning in which there is a 'neat separation' between ideas and
descriptions, on the one hand, and what those ideas and descriptions
are about, on the other. 19 Expressive language does not represent an
16 Cooper, p.166. From the perspective of signiJicafll meaning. images of
physical attachmenl help to evoke our attachment to the physical embodi-
ments of our personal attachment to significance, and to one another.
17 W. H. Auden, Secondary Worlds, London, 1968. p.l04.
18 Auden, p.14.
19 Taylor, p.249.
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independently describable reality, for it helps to constitute the relevant
'reality', and above all marks 'the discriminations which are founda-
tional to human concerns, and hence [opens] us to these concerns '.20
Clearly, the 'personal' character of communication comes in
degrees. Apologies, confessions, declarations of love, expressions of
gratitude, and promises, for example, are strongly personal, and
highly specific, forms of personal speech.21 So the term 'personal
speech' can be regarded as a generalization across these specific
forms and many others, just as 'cause' and 'relation' are likewise
generalizations across their respective instances.
Personal speech has a reciprocal structure: It first requires a
speaker to draw anemion to himself and to identify with his unerance
(e.g. by his facial expression, gestures, tone of voice and choice of
words). As will be seen, the necessity for someone to identify with
something (a gesture, an utterance, a role) not unique to themselves
lies at the heart of personal speech and personal existence. A personal
utterance is, secondly, only 'completed' through the response of
another, a response which is both 'faithful and striking': 'faithful', in
as much as it manifests recognition of what the speaker has said and
done (made a confession, a declaration, an apology etc.);22'striking',
in that it evokes in the first speaker a recognition that the other has
responded in his own terms, with his own attachment to
significance.23 The response will thus differ somewhat from the
20 Taylor, p.263.
21 Indeed, the structure of personal speech is presupposed in all human
communication, pace the Gricean structure of looped intentions.
22 The idiom of 'making' confessions, declarations, etc. is suggestive of the
point I am arguing-that the significance of these utterances transcends the
individual speaker; he does something which constitutes the realization
(the 'making') of somcthing more than itself, and not cntirely within his
control.
23 The idea of a 'faithful addition' was suggested to me by Arnold Burms on the
basis of some remarks of Walter Benjamin on translation. Cf. Walter
Benjamin, 'The Task of the Translator (An Introduction to the Translation
of Baudelaire's Tableau Parisiens)' in Illuminations, Hannah Arendt (ed.),
Harry Zohn (trans.), London, 1973, pp.69·82. Benjamin's article is often
obscure, but includes the suggestions that the translation of a literary work
is part of its 'afterlife'; the translatability of a work is inherent in its
original significance, and translation expresses the reciprocal relationship
between languages. Translation cannot strive for exact reproduction of the
original, but is part of that continual transformation and renewal of the
'living' original. Over the centuries the significance of both original and
translation is subject to transformation and renewal in their respective
languages; translation 'catches fire on the eternal life of the works and the
perpetual renewal of language' (74).
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original utterance, 'differ' enough for the original speaker to know
that the other has taken him seriously and is responding on his own
account. The response may well clarify the first utterance, or set it in a
new context; it will often be its requisite completion-the acceptance
of an apology, forgiveness after confession, and so on. As a
completing personal response it will never be mere repetition, never a
bland 'I hear what you are saying'. Moreover, the response is not
something the first speaker could make entirely his own. Neutral
information, e.g. the answer to a question, is public propeny and
could as well be uttered and passed on by its recipient. The acceptance
of an apology, however, remains tied to the respondent as his
'faithful addition' to the initial utterance. This structure of the 'faithful
addition' is the essence of personal speech.
The reciprocal structure of personal speech is founded in the
meaning speakers have for each other. It is of a different order to
both 'conversational implicatures' and to the 'standard and natural'
responses to speech acts (questions expecting answers, etc.), which
concern only information content. Roben Fogelin, defending a
speech-act account of metaphor, says that sometimes:
when we perfonn a speech act, we anticipate the content of.. the
standard and natural response. and that response is precisely what
we are trying to evoke.24
The personal significance of an utterance, however, cannot be
anticipated in the way the response to a rhetorical question, or the
'correction' of an ironic comment, might be,2S for it must to be some
extent the 'striking' response of the other.
In personal speech, one is attached to one's utterance, to 'what it
says', as the embodiment of onc's meaning to another (as seeking
forgiveness, as declaring love). One cannot know in advance that the
relationship will sustain this significance, or that one's utterance will
be received as embodying it. Personal speech is always dangerous
because a speaker must identify with 'what he says', an utterance
with an independent semantic content, context-free and as such
neither unique to the speaker, nor beyond contamination by
circumstances outside his control. In making an apology I may
inadvenently use words which, as it happens, compound my original
offence. Nothing guarantees the other will find my words and
gestures the striking embodimcnt of my significance to him and of the
significance of our relationship.
24 Cf. Fogelin. p.?
25 Fogelin. p.8.
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Furthermore, when personal speech is 'successful', it is not
because the words uttered are adequate to the significance sought and
found. It is simply because speakers continue to be struck by them, to
fmd them apt. In their shared sensibility they 'are in touch with each
other'. The model of transparent, linguistic meaning (as developed in
standard 'theories of meaning') fosters thc tempting idea that adequate
words for significance should be available, as if in place of 'I love
you' a couple could find the words which expressed (the significance
of) just their relationship. However significance is not a 'content' that
could be catered for within a semantic theory. Significance resides in
'mutual attachment' to what might easily not embody it: a couple may
come to hear their words of love as merely the romantic froth of soap
opera.26
So personal speech is inherently 'suspended', awaiting the free
response of an other, a faithful but striking response which, like the
initial utterance, is in tum exposed to danger. This suspension carmot
be avoided, for any definitive, 'invulnerable' response would be
either no longer contingent on the initial utterance, or wholly
necessitated by it. If I will be forgiven no matter what I say or do, I
cease to matter, if) am sure to extract forgiveness, then 'forgiveness'
is no longer what I receive.
The reciprocal structure of personal speech is both inescapable,
and an idcal to which we often try to approximate. However much
our actual conversations fall short of it, if apologies were never
received, confessions never followed by forgiveness, and
declarations of love never returned, these species of personal speech
would not exist. Only in the light of this structure can departures from
it can be understood. The bland ') hear what you are saying' might
constitute precisely a refusal to respond in the way the speaker
desires, and sometimes has a right to expect.
Some empirical observations support, or at least illustrate, the
formal structure that has been identified. For example, the tension
between the 'faithful' and the 'striking' aspects of a response
differentiates some varieties of psychotherapeutic technique. The
'interpretations' of an analyst highlight the way a 'striking' response
may be necessary for increased self-understanding; the 'non-directivc'
techniques of Carl Rogers, on the other hand, emphasize the 'faithful'
response, virtually a repetition but with an affirming expression and
26 Poetry and metaphor attempt to overcome the generalizing tendencies of
language. not through the designating of a unique content; but rather in
virtue or our attachment to certain images and similarities etc.
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tone of voice aimed at helping a client to identify with thoughts and
utterances he finds difficult to accept. The 'confrontational' style of
some Gestalt therapy perhaps emphasizes the independence and
freedom of the person addressed, who refuses to be manipulated by
the speaker.
Our everyday experiences of conversation can also be described
in terms of the 'faithful yet striking' polarity: fruitful conversation
becomes difficult both with people whose responses are insufficiently
faithful (they haven't heard what has been said, or don't wish to, or
are too busy planning what they wish to say next), and with those
whose responses are overly striking (they are too eager to correct, to
dispute, to distance themselves from what has been said).
I have argued that personal speech involves a reciprocal structure
which transcends the transmission of information. It involves a
paradoxical 'suspension' of significance which cannot be resolved by
anything an individual speaker might say or do. Personal speech and
'significant meaning' is thus not amenable to the kind of naturalistic
account currently fashionable in the philosophy of language. Its
intelligibility is rather 'non-natural' in the way Elizabeth Anscombe
has argued all language isP
The non-natural reciprocity (and significance) of personal speech
is apparent from that fact that an apology and its acceptance cannot be
explained in standard naturalistic terms (e.g. of Grice, Blackburn or
Fogelin). An utterance can only be an apology because of its
significance within a distinctive kind of 'interaction' between speaker
and respondent, and the signi ficance of an apology (Le. the structure
of that interaction) is created by language (and practice): that is to say,
'an apology' is not the name of a pre-linguistic natural phenomenon
(e.g. a complex of feelings, intentions, beliefs and desires) which is
simply, and subsequently, expressed or signified by some utterance.
Of course, saying 'I apologize for doing X' is a conventional way of
making an apology, and conventionally expects its acceptance. It may
be a matter of convention that this utterance is, other things being
equal, received as an apology. However, we need to distinguish
between conventions governing the making and accepting of
apologies (knowing 'what to say'), and the question of what an
apology is (its significance, 'what it means').
An apology is an utterance which helps to restore a valued, Le.
27 G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Rules, Rights and Promises' in Collected Philo-
sophical Papers. Vol Ill. Ethics. Religion and Politics. Oxford, 1981,
pp.97-I03.
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significant relationship. The utterance both signifies and constitutes a
stage in this restoration, and finds its completion in the acceptance of
the person addressed. The unerance is not the 'naturally intelligible'
sign or expression of a phenomenon independent of the structure of
significance which is constituted by the apology and its acceptance.
An utterance can only be an apology in vinue of this 'non-natural'
interpersonal transaction. Neither an expression of apology nor an
expression of its acceptance can be adequately understood apan from
this reciprocal structure. For example, an apology cannot be
understood in terms of the Gricean mechanism, as a special
communicative intention that would remain within the control of the
speaker. Even if others understand 'I hereby want you to know that 1
apologize for doing X' as the intention behind my utterance, it would
still be appropriate to ask, 'And do you apologize?'. Nor, following
Simon Blackbum,28 is making an apology equivalent to making an
utterance which is the conventional display of the belief that one
wishes to apologize. First, because the 'uptake' one seeks from an
apology is its acceptance; it is not sufficient that the audience comes to
believe one wishes to apologize. Secondly, because the conventional
display of this belief presupposes and so cannot explain what it is for
something to be an apology.
The reciprocal structure of personal speech transcends both
speaker and hearer: each in turn identifies with his own utterance
(apology, acceptance) and wants his utterance to be incorporated in
the response of the other (so that the acceptance is an acceptance of
this apology), while also being transformed by the utterance of the
other (whose acceptance it is). Pace Fogelin's account of 'standard
and natural' responses to speech acts, the speaker cannot, in the sense
that matters, 'anticipate' the response he seeks. Anticipation is
impossible not because the speaker lacks cenain information, or
cannot predict what the other will say. Rather, anticipation would
undermine the significance of the dialogue; it would usurp the
response of the other, just as laughing too early at one's own joke
undermines its humour and effectiveness.
The reciprocity of personal speech may also be described by
saying that each speaker wants to occupy the position of the other,
- even though it remains essential that neither can do so. Someone
apologizing wants to be able to identify with the acceptance he
receives (as bearing on his apology). The respondent needs to identify
with the apology he is accepting. Each is drawn into the structure of
28 Cf. Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word, Oxford, 1984.
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the 'faithful addition'. Both speaker and respondent are united in their
attachment to, their attempt to identify with, the other's as well as
their own utterances.29
The same structure is illustrated by confession and forgiveness: A
husband admits to his wife that he has been out gambling, not
working back at the office as he had previously said. His utterance is
a 'confession', not the mere retailing of information. He seeks a
response from his wife that both acknowledges his fault (and does not
deny it), and also expresses forgiveness. He desires a response which
indicates that his wife has indeed been 'touched' by his confession,
and so her response must be in some way beyond his control, and yet
able to touch him in return. It is critical that she forgives him; a
forgiveness wholly within his control would be worthless.
It is apparent that the reciprocal structure of significance cannot be
explained in terms of the paradigms of semantic- or speaker-meaning
mentioned at the outset. Personal speech transcends pragmatic
speaker-meaning, while disquotational claims about what its
utterances say will be trivial ('I apologize for doing X' is true if and
only if the speaker apologizes for doing X). Personal speech depends
on the meaning speakers have for each other. Significant meaning,
like all meaning, is the object of understanding. To understand the
meaning of a promise or an apology, is simply understanding what a
promise is, what an apology or declaration of love is; it is to
understand an 'essence' created by language and practice which bears
upon the meaning people have for each other. Adapting Scruton's
formulation-if aesthetic meaning is 'immanent in an experience'
(of a work of art), so the meaning of personal speech is 'immanent
in' an understanding of these reciprocal relationships constituted
by language. 'What' is here understood cannot be reduced to a
naturalistic phenomenon; nor is it a peculiar intensional entity. The
conclusion is simply that, pace empiricism, the practices of human
intelligence3o• the use of language, and the structures of human
significance, cannot be explained in (Humean) 'naturalistic' terms, the
29 A further variation on the structure is exhibited by the 'Don Iuan' strategy.
Asked. 'Will you keep your promise to marry me?', he replies. 'Your beauty
demands it'. He has of course not made a promise at all, yet he tries to
present the promise as a fact in the eyes of the other. If someone replies to
a proffered apology, 'Of course, you deserve to be forgiven', he has not
actually accepted the apology. The manipulation consists in the respondent
getting the speaker to identify with an utterance, without his being willing
to do so himself. lowe this suggestion to Hedwig Schwall.
30 Cf. Anscombe, p.103.
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terms of information transfer. Significant meaning presupposes, but
is not reducible to, neutral information. Personal speech goes beyond
the transmission of information, because it helps determine the
relevance of information by bringing it within a context of
significance. A confession will include information about the
speaker's actions; a declaration of love might include descriptions of a
person's state of mind, and of desirable features of the beloved; the
simple statement that one has had a exhausting day at work may be
meant to elicit affirmation and support. But these statements are not
just the retailing of information. Indeed, as Cooper has shown, there
is no 'standing assumption' that indicative utterances are committed
assertions31 • Personal speech transcends the 'language game of
information', just as rituals of hospitality, meals and gift-giving
transcend biological needs and utility.
5. Metaphor as 'personal speech'.
Metaphorical speech can now be further illuminated in terms of
this model of personal speech. Metaphor is the 'maverick' use of an
utterance whose point or significance goes beyond its linguistic
meaning as a 'saying'. A metaphor-maker combines 'words into
unexpected utterances' (Cooper, 187) and takes his utterance out of
the realm of sober description or the retailing of information; his
'maverick' saying cannot but draw attention to himself, and to his
assumption that his utterance has a point or relevance his audience
will appreciate. He invites their cooperative understanding against a
background of shared sensibility; he shows that he in tum is one 'on
whom reciprocation of metaphor is not wasted' (Cooper, 167). In
metaphorical speech speaker and hearer desire to be united through
the words they find appropriate. As Wittgenstein noted, agreement
over the suitability of words is the crucial reaction which put 'people
in touch with one another' (RPP,I,377). Adapting the deconstruc-
. tionist outlook, one might say that while metaphor-makers and their
audience know what they are saying, they do not in the same way
know 'what they mean'; that is: they cannot fully anticipate the signi-
ficance their sayings will acquire, nor prevent them failing to be signi-
ficant; nor, when' successful', do they fully comprehend the signifi-
cance, the context of intimacy in which their sayings find relevance.
There is a certain 'blindness' in their attachment to their utterances.32
31 Cooper. p.I02.
32 A feature of all rule-governed. meaningful action. according to
Wittgenstein (cr. Pl. 219).
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Metaphors invoke the reciprocal or dialogical character of all
personal speech: it matters to speakers how their metaphors are
received. Metaphor reception is a 'cooperative act of understanding',
never simply the 'unpacking' of a pre-existing meaning; moreover it
allows for interpretation in ways a speaker could not have imagined.
Reception and interpretation reveal, not a hidden linguistic meaning,
but the background intimacy of the speakers, their sensibilities and
attitudes, their relevant assumptions and judgments.
The context of intimacy accounts for the 'appropriateness' of
metaphor interpretation, and so explains why, for instance,
philosophers should make more of Foucault's remark, 'Knowledge is
an instrument for cutting', than would readers ignorant of the history
of epistemology. The intimacy which metaphor presupposes and
reinforces thus functions to 'restrict' its interpretation. Precisely
because metaphors have no (special) semantic meaning their reception
by a particular group needs to include a restriction, a 'channelling' of
their possibly indefinite effects. One might say, a metaphor is only
'received' when it has found its appropriate community, the speakers
who-for reasons of 'intimacy'-find it apt.
The use of metaphor thus involves a reciprocity which
'transcends' the individual utterances of which it is composed. What
transcends the individual utterances is not a special propositional
content, but the context of intimacy wilhin which they find their
significance. Accordingly, the response to a metaphor which signifies
its reception must recognize the significance that has been invoked. It
must both cohere with the initial utterance, and go beyond it. It must
be a 'faithful addition' to what was said: 'faithful' yet also 'striking'
and somewhat evocative in its turn of the significance both utterances
presuppose.
Davidson rashly claimed that just as there are no unfunny jokes,
so there are no unsuccessful metaphors, since a metaphor always has
some effect or other.33 However, as Ted Cohen's study of jokes and
metaphors makes clear, both are liable to a distinctive son of failure;
the 'uptake' they demand may be unfonhcoming. If a metaphor is
taken literally, or if a joke is spelled out in paraphrase, it is
undermined. Metaphorical speech, like personal speech, is always
dangerous. An audience's failure to find a metaphor appropriate (or to
laugh at a joke), will rebound on the speaker; his appeal to intimacy
has been misplaced. It may well be he who is excluded from a cenain
community of sensibility and practice (e.g., by employing a racist
33 Davidson, p.245.
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joke or metaphor). His utterance rebounds as does a declaration of
love that is rejected. Metaphors and jokes, as exemplars of personal
speech, have the capacity to draw people together (and to drive them
apart). In the former case, they involve, in Ted Cohen's words, a
'marvellous renexivity'34; their uptake (agreement, laughter) is
prompted by the utterance, and yet is free; their effects are 'both
unforced and fitting' (a 'faithful addition'): 'in laughing we fit
ourselves to a joke [in a] relation of self-warranting propriety' ...
We find ourselves reflected in a surface which mirrors our dearest
and perhaps most human hope: to do well, but not under
compulsion.3S
In its appeal to intimacy, metaphor involves the same
'suspension' of significance that is at the heart of personal speech.
Again the 'deconstructionist' idiom is appropriate: speakers do not
know 'what they mean' (to one another), while knowing quite well
what they are saying. From that perspective of 'deconstruction',
Jonathan Culler's analysis of a joke echoes that of Cohen.
The listener does not control the outburst of laughter: the text
provokes it (the joke, one says, made me laugh). But ... the
unpredictable response determines the nature of the text [the
joke, the metaphorl that is supposed to have produced it. No
compromise formulation, with the reader partly in control and
the text partly in control, would accurately describe this
situation, which is captured, rather, by juxtaposition of two
absolute perspcctives.36
Davidson thinks jokes and metaphors never fail to be what they
are because he overlooks the reciprocal character of metaphor and
personal speech, with its suspension of significance between two
(relatively) absolute perspectives. A metaphor-maker is not entirely in
control of his utterance.
Metaphor, like all personal speech, is an 'indirect' style of
communication because it leaves room for the person addressed to
respond appropriately (e.g. to a confession with forgiveness), to be
united in an attitude (e.g. that presupposed by a joke), to adopt a
moral stance (e.g. after exhortation or preaching). Whenever personal
significance is at stake, forms of speech which strive to be totally
compelling-relying solely on logical inference or the accumulation of
34 Ted Cohen, 'Jokes' in Eva Schaper (ed.) Pleasure. preference and value
Cambridge, 1983. p.136.
35 Cohen, p.136.
36 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After
Structuralism, London, 1983, p.73.
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infonnation---are likely to be counter-productive. They fail to allow
space for the discovery and cultivation of significance which provides
the personal context for inference and fact.
6. Conclusion.
I have sought to analyse the structure of 'personal speech',
showing how it involves an experience of 'significant meaning'. The
successful use of metaphorical utterances relies on this structure, and
finds its point or significance in the anticipation of a response which
will be its 'faithful addition'; communication involving metaphorical
utterances thus defies reductive explanation in tenns of semantic
and/or pragmatic meanings alone.
It might be objected that the reciprocal structure I have identified
is, in varying degrees. presupposed in all instances of
communication, including inquiries for straight infonnation which
demand little 'intimacy' at all between speakers, and so is not
distinctive or explanatory of metaphorical speech. I readily agree that
the kind of personal meaning I am concerned with is all-pervasive in
human communication.37 Although I have focussed on the significam
meaning of personal speech. I could as well have studied the personal
significance of all speech. However, particular species of 'personal
speech', such as metaphor, highlight the role of 'significant meaning'
and allow its structure to be perceived more clearly. The all-pervasive
necessity of some degree of 'significant meaning' entails that
naturalistic accounts of human language (e.g. in tenns of 'looped'
Gricean intentions) will be inadequate. These accounts require the
supplementary recognition that 'significant meaning' is constitutive of
human existence, which is thereby more mysterious than naturalistic
explanations would have us believe.
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